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BUT HOW WILL THE PEOPLE KNOW?
PUBLIC OPINION AS A MEAGER INFLUENCE




THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION. By
Barry Friedman. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2009. Pp. 614. $35.
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Roberts famously described the ideal Supreme Court
Justice as analogous to a baseball umpire, who simply "applies" the rules,
rather than making them. Roberts promised to "remember that it's my job to
call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat."' At her own recent confirma-
tion hearings, Elena Kagan demurred, opining that Roberts's metaphor
might erroneously suggest that "everything is clear-cut, and that there's no
judgment in the process."2
Based on his 2009 book, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion
Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitu-
tion, Barry Friedman 3 would likely reject the Chief Justice's analogy as
well, but for a different reason. Friedman might describe Supreme Court
Justices as umpires who call the balls and strikes, but whose future calls in
constitutional law cases might be influenced by an angry crowd-leading
them, for example, to reverse the call of a strike if the fans believed strongly
enough that the pitch was low and outside.
Friedman offers The Will of the People as a response to a "persistent
complaint about judicial accountability"-that unelected and unaccountable
judges wield tremendous power, which thwarts democratic judgments (p. 6).
As Friedman relates this complaint, which has famously been described as
the "countermajoritarian difficulty," "when the justices base a ruling on the
* Partner, Goldstein, Howe, & Russell, P.C.; Lecturer, Stanford and Harvard Law Schools;
Publisher, SCOTUSblog.com.
** Partner, Goldstein, Howe & Russell, P.C.; Lecturer, Stanford and Harvard Law Schools;
Editor, SCOTUSblog.com.
1. Jack Shafer, How the Court Imitates the World Series, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2005), http://
www.slate.com/id/2126241/.
2. Josh Gerstein, Elena Kagan: Supreme Court judging requires actual judgment, POLITICO
(July 1, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/39227.html.
3. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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Constitution, the country must live with that decision unless and until the
Court reverses itself or the rare constitutional amendment is adopted. There
is no overriding the Court otherwise" (p. 5).
Friedman offers an account of the relationship between the Court and
the public in which this complaint is unfounded. In his view, it is the public
that is in fact calling the game. Rather than thwarting popular will, the Court
over time largely aligns itself with public opinion: "[T]hrough the process of
judicial responsiveness to public opinion ... the meaning of the Constitu-
tion takes shape. The Court rules. The public responds. Over time,
sometimes a long period, public opinion jells, and the Court comes into line
with the considered views of the American public" (p. 383). Friedman
grounds this thesis in a detailed history of judicial review and the Supreme
Court, starting with the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 and conclud-
ing with the end of the Rehnquist Court in 2005.
Our Review of The Will of the People proceeds in two Parts. The first
Part recounts Friedman's thesis in more detail. The second considers wheth-
er Friedman's thesis accounts for the decisions of the Roberts Court,
including how it might play out in the looming constitutional fights over
same-sex marriage, health care reform, and state immigration law.
I. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: THE COURT, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND PUBLIC OPINION, 1789-2005
Friedman devotes most of his book to an extensive (and exhaustive) sur-
vey of the role of the Supreme Court and judicial review in U.S. history as
he sees it. He divides that history into "four critical periods," with each hav-
ing significant implications for the relationship between the Court and
public opinion (p. 12).
Friedman's first period begins shortly after independence and lasts until
the early 1800s. Initially, Friedman relates, "judicial review appeared off to
a strong start": although employed relatively rarely, and generally in cases
that did not carry "grave consequence [s]," the overall public reaction was
one of acceptance (p. 43). To be sure, some members of the public contin-
ued to harbor misgivings about judicial review-then, as now, because of
concerns about giving power to unelected and unaccountable judges-but
judicial review was widely regarded as the only "satisfactory alternative to
the problem of unconstitutional legislation" (p. 41).
The honeymoon period for judicial review quickly ended, however, with
the election of 1800, when Republicans captured control of both Congress
and the White House, leading Federalists to respond by hijacking the judici-
ary for largely partisan purposes. As a result, Friedman explains, "the
question of judicial review proved secondary to a much more fundamental
challenge: whether the judiciary would manage to survive as an independent
branch of government" (p. 44). After a series of partisan battles that culmi-
nated in the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, relative peace
was secured by what Friedman characterizes as a "tacit deal" (p. 45) in
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which "judicial independence was guaranteed so long as the judges re-
frained from engaging in blatant partisan politics from the bench" (p. 12).
With judicial independence secure, the country and the Court moved in-
to Friedman's second period, which would last until the 1830s. During this
time, the Court issued "what to this day are acknowledged to be its great
nationalizing opinions" (p. 79)-particularly, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
Gibbons v. Ogden," and McCulloch v. Maryland. However, those deci-
sions-which Friedman describes as "often [running] ahead of existing
sentiments for union" (p. 80)-met with resistance from the states, which
had begun to chafe at federal control and "[r]epeatedly ... recurred to the
argument that there could be no umpire in their disputes with the national
government-and certainly not the Supreme Court" (p. 73). Resistance no-
tably took the form of "official[] sanctioned defiance" of the Court's
constitutional decisions (p. 12): for example, "Georgia actually hanged a
man in the face of a Supreme Court order to the contrary" (p. 12). Disputes
over the Court's authority came to a head in the 1832 Nullification Crisis, in
which South Carolina enacted an ordinance that not only declared a federal
tariff "'null, void, and no law'-and therefore not binding on state offi-
cials"-but also forbade any appeal of a challenge to the law to the Supreme
Court (p. 99). Friedman largely credits federal officials, and in particular
President (and states' rights advocate) Andrew Jackson, with ending the cri-
sis by taking a firm position in support of federal authority; in so doing,
Jackson reaffirmed the judiciary's role in resolving federal-state disputes
(pp. 101-04).
With the nullification crisis largely abated, the country entered Fried-
man's third period, which would begin with the Court's infamous 1857
decision in Dred Scott and continue for nearly a century. As Friedman re-
lates, Dred Scott "set off a firestorm of criticism, wounding the Court as it
has not been since" (p. 112). But the response to Dred Scott, Friedman ar-
gues, ironically demonstrated the country's commitment to judicial review,
as government officials now sought to evade rather than formally defy the
Court's ruling.
In this period, the other branches of government sought to mitigate judi-
cial review by seeking to control the Court "to ensure that disfavored
decisions were simply not rendered in the first place or, if rendered, were
quickly reversed"-including through such tactics as jurisdiction stripping
and court packing (pp. 106-07). During the second half of this era, the Court
regained its power by siding with constituencies that could protect it: its deci-
sions dismantling Reconstruction-era legislation garnered "widespread
4. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishing that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review state court decisions involving federal law).
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (establishing that Congress has power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate all aspects of commerce between the states).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (establishing that Congress has the power to charter a
national bank).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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plaudits from an American populace fatigued by the effort to guarantee
African-Americans their security, political rights, and some measure of
equality," while the Court also "took corporate America under its wing, of-
fering interstate businesses a refuge from the hostile actions of state
governments and state courts" (p. 138).
The 1937 battle over President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing
plan both ushered in the modern era and served as one of the cornerstones of
Friedman's thesis. After his election in 1932, Roosevelt sought to combat
the woes arising from the Great Depression by expanding the government's
authority. But "[t]ime and again, Roosevelt found his program stymied by a
Supreme Court refusing to interpret the Constitution to cede broad control
over the economy either to the federal government or to the states" (p. 195).
Moreover, Friedman recounts, the Court's decisions "also ran up against the
American people's evolving judgment of what the Constitution meant"
(p. 205), with the public now believing that the Constitution "should be con-
strued . . . to keep pace with the changing times" (p. 214). Thus, in February
1937 Roosevelt introduced a plan to "reorganize" the federal judiciary by,
among other things, adding new Justices to the Court. Roosevelt's plan met
with opposition from the public, which Friedman characterizes as "reluctant
to see [the Court's] independence tampered with by politics" (p. 236); but in
any event, "the Court seemed to switch directions, handing down several
dramatic decisions that upheld state and federal economic measures"
(pp. 225-26). This "switch in time," combined with the retirement of Justice
Willis Van Devanter, led to the demise of Roosevelt's plan. Friedman hy-
pothesizes that "had the Court not capitulated ... , Americans might well
have approved Roosevelt's plan" (p. 236). Moreover, Friedman contends,
"judicial review now was widely valued, but only so long as important judi-
cial decisions did not wander far from the mainstream of American belief
about the meaning of the Constitution" (p. 236).
Friedman focuses next on the Warren Court, beginning with its 1954 de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education. Here too Friedman describes a
"symbiotic relationship between popular opinion and judicial review"
(p. 14). He notes, for example, that the Court's first decision in Brown drew
praise and encountered relatively little resistance in the South precisely be-
cause it "did not actually order anything to be done" (pp. 245-46). When the
Court later turned to the question of how best to order desegregation, he
explains, it purposely established the "all deliberate speed" standard "out of
concern that the Court not be made to appear powerless" (p. 246).
"[M]assive resistance" (p. 247) eventually ensued, requiring President
Eisenhower to send in federal troops; here, Friedman emphasizes that al-
though, "[i]n the wake of the Little Rock controversy, the Supreme Court
issued what is arguably its strongest statement of judicial supremacy in all
of American history" (p. 248)-its decision in Cooper v. Aaron9-it did so
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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only "after the President had already sent in the troops to support it"
(p. 248).
The Court's concern for public opinion and its desire to avoid rocking
the boat played out again on the issue of interracial marriage-a question
that first came to the Court in 1956. Because "mixed marriage was a sensi-
tive issue throughout the country," the Court sought to skirt the question,
striking down laws prohibiting interracial marriage only after Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Act (pp. 249-50).
Concluding with the Rehnquist Court, Friedman depicts the Court of
this era as a "political foil" (p. 353) for extremists on both ends of the ideo-
logical spectrum, who were motivated by (and sought to motivate their
followers with) "wedge" social issues such as abortion and affirmative ac-
tion (pp. 352-53). But those extremists' complaints, Friedman explains,
"fell on deaf ears because despite all the hype, it turned out the public
agreed with the justices' decisions. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that
the justices were following social trends, and by doing so were often decid-
ing cases consistent with public opinion" (pp. 353-54). This latest
development led to "the ultimate irony": "critics began to challenge the
Court, not because it was defeating the popular will but because it was ful-
filling it" (p. 364).
II. THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ROBERTS COURT
The Will of the People is an engaging and thorough history, but it does
not accomplish its goal of persuasively responding to the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, at least with respect to the work of the Roberts Court.
Although few areas of constitutional law are sufficiently important that they
produce polling on public attitudes, we accept as the best available method-
ology Friedman's generally anecdotal effort to draw on press coverage of
the Court's decisions and accounts of the public's views on various issues
generally. But contrary to Friedman's account, the Supreme Court's modern
constitutional jurisprudence overwhelmingly does not correspond to a mod-
el in which decisions generate a public debate, to which the Justices then
adapt.
It does seem fair to say that, on the very few constitutional questions
that generate significant public interest, the Court's decisions remain
within the mainstream of public opinion. For example, it is hard to imag-
ine the Court having decided Roe v. Wade'o without the feminism
revolution or Lawrence v. Texas" absent the greater social acceptance of
gay rights. But those are two isolated rulings decided decades apart, and
even in that narrow subset of the Court's much broader body of work, the
impetus for jurisprudential shifts seems to be a change in its membership
resulting from the ordinary political process of presidential appointment
and Senate confirmation.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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A. The 2009 Supreme Court Term
The October 2009 Term offers an opportune vehicle for illustrating that
Friedman's theory is not persuasive. The term included a representative array
of constitutional rulings. The Court issued two high-profile decisions on con-
stitutional questions, invalidating both a limit on corporate and union
spending in elections" and a ban on handgun possession. 3 It also invalidated
the limits on the president's power to remove members of the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board; 4 a federal statute criminalizing depictions
of animal cruelty;'" and statutes permitting the imposition of life sentences
without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. By contrast, the
Court rejected constitutional challenges to a federal law authorizing the in-
definite detention of sex offenders;1 a state court ruling upholding a statute
reclaiming beachfront property; and a state law requiring the disclosure of
petition signatories." Finally, in response to constitutional challenges, the
Court upheld but narrowly construed the "honest services" criminal statute20
and the federal terrorist "material support" statute.
Only one of the eighteen constitutional rulings seems to fit the theory of
The Will of the People. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applies to state and local gun regula-
tion. McDonald extended the Court's holding from two terms earlier in
District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment confers a right
to possess a firearm unconnected to service in an organized militia. Both
McDonald and Heller narrowly read or overruled prior precedents.2 In both
cases, the Court's rulings track public opinion, which in turn seems
grounded in a felt sense that gun rights have a constitutional foundation ra-
ther than merely being a "good thing."23
12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
13. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
14. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
15. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
16. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
17. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
18. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
19. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
20. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
21. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
22. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
23. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
24. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (holding that the Second Amendment
does not prohibit firearms conviction); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (establish-
ing that the Second Amendment applies only to the federal government).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans in Agreement with Supreme Court on Gun Rights,
GALLUP (June 26, 2008), http://www.gallup.comipollI1O8394/Americans-Agreement-Supreme-
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But public opinion does not represent a material influence with respect
to the other seventeen constitutional rulings. One decision in fact provides a
clear counterexample to Friedman's theory. In Citizens United v. FEC, the
Court overruled a recent precedent, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce,26 to hold that corporations and unions have a First Amendment right
to participate in political campaigns. There was no public movement calling
for that jurisprudential shift, which may have significant consequences for
elections. To the contrary, the repeated enactment of campaign finance legis-
lation suggests its popularity. The Court's prior ruling upholding the same
statutory scheme only a few terms before 27 had sparked no protest. But look-
ing forward, there is no genuine prospect that the negative public response
to Citizens United-stoked by the Obama Administration-will trigger a
reversal of course. Citizens United instead represents a committed view of a
majority of the Court that the Constitution broadly guarantees a right to par-
ticipate in political campaigns.
Most of the remaining constitutional rulings from the October 2009
Term simply do not register in the public consciousness. But that is not be-
cause they are trivial and therefore immune from concerns about decision
making by unelected judges. For example, the civil commitment ruling,
Comstock v. United States, had the potential to narrow federal legislative
power materially, if the constitutional claim in that case had been accepted.
In fact, Comstock will inevitably be one of the principal precedents cited in
the high-profile litigation over the constitutionality of health care reform.
The honest services decision, Skilling v. United States, is significant as well,
as it significantly limits a commonly invoked prosecutorial tool. The ruling
on presidential control over removal of officials, Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, calls into question the constitutionality of hundreds of other gov-
ernmental positions.28
But with respect to those rulings and almost all of the others, there is no
public conversation that could lead to a reshaping of the Court's decision
making. On our website-SCOTUSblog-we attempt to track all of the
coverage of the Court's decisions in the mainstream media and in the blo-
gosphere. With the exception of the guns and campaign finance rulings,
none of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence produced more than a whis-
per in the popular press.
Obviously, a single term provides only a snapshot. But nothing about the
October 2009 Term makes it anomalous. The Court's constitutional rulings
were not uniquely low-profile. If anything, Citizens United and McDonald
were unusually prominent decisions.
Court-Gun-Rights.aspx ("A clear majority of the U.S. public-73%-believes the Second Amend-
ment to the Constitution guarantees the rights of Americans to own guns.").
26. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
27. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
28. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179-80 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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B. Shifts in the Supreme Court's Personnel
The theory of the The Will of the People does not seem descriptively ac-
curate even when applied across decades rather than a single year, and even
when narrowly limited to the Court's most prominent decisions, as opposed
to all of the constitutional rulings that implicate the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty. In four significant areas of the law, the Court has recently shifted
jurisprudentially in a fashion that more closely tracks public opinion. These
are the decisions most likely to support Friedman's view. The expansion of
gun rights in Heller and McDonald were discussed above. The Court has
narrowed the abortion right in the line of decisions from Roe v. Wade to
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey29 to Gonzales v.
Carhart.0 It has expanded gay rights, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick' in
Lawrence v. Texas. And it has narrowed the circumstances in which race-
based decision making-including affirmative action programs-will be
upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Those examples, however, are better explained by a shift in the Court's
membership: the replacement of Justice O'Connor with the substantially
more conservative Justice Alito, which also gave rise to the ascendancy of
Justice Kennedy as the median vote on a deeply divided Court. As Justice
Breyer stated after the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, in a line he included in a dissent from the bench but not his written
opinion, "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so
much."3 And with respect to each of these issues, the Court is narrowly di-
vided. The fact that the shift of a single vote-the successful appointment of
Harriet Miers, for example-could have produced the opposite outcome
undercuts a claimed causal relationship to broader trends in public opinion.
Take abortion. No member of the majority that decided Roe v. Wade re-
sponded to a shift in public opinion by later deciding to narrow the abortion
right in Casey. Instead, the controlling plurality in Casey was composed of
three subsequent Republican appointees who were simply more conserva-
tive: Justices O'Connor and Kennedy (by President Reagan), and Souter (by
President George H.W. Bush). The effect of new appointments on abortion
jurisprudence is best illustrated by the example of statutes banning so-called
partial-birth abortion: a five-Justice majority invalidated a state prohibition
because it did not include an exception for the health of the mother4; but
just a few years later, when Justice O'Connor retired and was replaced by
Justice Alito, the Court reversed course and upheld an indistinguishable fed-
29. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
33. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race In Integration Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2007, at Al (noting that Breyer's "most pointed words ... appeared nowhere in his
77-page opinion").
34. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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eral statute." Similarly, although the Court had given its tentative approval
to race-based admissions programs with Justice O'Connor on the Court,6 it
took a significantly more restrictive approach after her retirement in Parents
Involved. Public opinion did not change in the interim; the Justices did.
If anything, there are even more counterexamples to Friedman's theory
of prominent constitutional rulings in which the Court has committed itself
to a position with which the public seems likely to disagree. A theory that is
right only half the time or less (in the very best case) is not a useful tool for
explaining the Court's behavior. The First Amendment limitations on cam-
paign finance reform in cases such as Citizens United were discussed above.
The Court adopted a broad reading of the government's eminent domain
power in Kelo v. City of New London3 8 that was deeply unpopular," and
which it has shown no interest in revisiting. It has recently limited the ability
to impose the death penalty, which remains popular -for example, by ca-
tegorically prohibiting execution for all non-homicide crimes in Kennedy v.
Louisiana.4 1 It has recognized a right to produce and distribute pornography,
including virtual child pornography.42 It also notably has never retreated
from extremely unpopular decisions43 banning school prayer" and recogniz-
45ing a constitutional right to bum the American flag.
Nor can other recent significant jurisprudential shifts be explained by a
developing public consensus. The most radical and sweeping lines of deci-
sions have involved the Sixth Amendment. Beginning in Apprendi v. New
35. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168.
36. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
37. In recent decades, the only arguable instance of a member of the Court changing her
view in a manner that tracks a broad trend in public opinion is the conclusion of Justice O'Connor,
who was a member of the Bowers majority, that the sodomy statute in Lawrence was unconstitu-
tional.
38. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
39. See, e.g., Adam Karlin, Property seizure backlash: State and federal lawmakers consider
new limits on takings in the wake of court decision, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNIToR, July 6, 2005, at I
(describing the decision as "fueling a nationwide backlash-rippling into homeowner outrage and
legislative action").
40. E.g., 62% Favor Death Penalty, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (June 8, 2010), http://www.
rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politicsgeneral-politics/june_2010/62-favor.-deathipenalty.
41. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
42. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
43. See, e.g., Joseph Carroll, Public Support for Constitutional Amendment on Flag Burning,
GALLUP (June 29, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/23524/public-support-constitutional-
amendment-flag-buming.aspx (citing poll indicating that "a majority of Americans support a consti-
tutional amendment that would allow Congress and state governments to make it illegal to burn the
American flag"); Linda Lyons, The Gallup Brain: Prayer in Public Schools, GALLUP (Dec. 10,
2002), http://www.gallup.com/poll/7393/gallup-brain-prayer-public-schools.aspx (describing issue
of school prayer as "one of the most divisive constitutional issues of our time" and summarizing
polling on Court's school-prayer decisions).
44. Lee v. Weisman ex rel. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
45. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Jersey,4 the Court has dramatically expanded a criminal defendant's right to
have facts relevant to his sentence found by a jury. On that basis, it subse-
quently held that the federal sentencing guidelines are advisory, not
binding.47
The Court has also expanded criminal defendants' rights by overturning
its framework for applying the Confrontation Clause, conferring an expan-
sive right to require direct testimony in an array of contexts.48 For example,
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts49 significantly reshaped the presentation of
evidence in a huge volume of criminal cases by holding that the reports of
laboratory tests cannot be introduced without affording the defendant the
opportunity to examine the laboratory technician.
Those decisions under the Sixth Amendment cannot fairly be traced to
any development in public opinion. Instead, they reflect an unusual align-
ment between the Court's idealistic ideological wings. In both lines of
decisions, the most liberal Justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter) joined
with the most conservative Justices (Scalia and Thomas), all of whom con-
cluded that the outcomes were compelled by a principled reading of the
Constitution.
Friedman's theory also fails to explain the other recent major develop-
ment in constitutional law: the Court's halting imposition of limits on
Congress's ability to subject states to suits by private parties for money
damages, and its related flirtation with a broader limitation on federal legis-
lative power. In a line of decisions beginning with Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,so the Court restricted Congress's authority to abrogate states' sov-
ereign immunity from damages suits." Those decisions had limited practical
impact because they left unaffected the power to sue for injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young.5 But even more important for present purposes, after
several years, the Court seemingly reversed course and recognized a broader
congressional authority to impose monetary liability.53 The Court also took a
step towards imposing significant limits for the first time on Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, but declined to go materially beyond
requiring Congress to make "findings" identifying the relationship between
46. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
47. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
48. E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980)).
49. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
50. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
51. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (suits under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (suits under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (suits under Fair Labor
Standards Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (patent suits).
52. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
53. Cent. Va. Comm. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (suits in bankruptcy); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (suits under the Family Medical Leave Act).
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its legislative goals and interstate commerce.5 None of those decisions-
neither the Court's initial foray into shifting towards a greater regard for
federalism nor its subsequent retreat from that initiative-are traceable to
either an initial public consensus favoring states' rights or a subsequent reac-
tion against the trajectory of the Court's rulings. And with the subsequent
departure of the two Justices who had been most inclined to states' rights-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor-there is no realistic pros-
pect that the "federalism revolution" will be reinvigorated, no matter what
turn public opinion might take in the coming years.
On a very broad level, changes in the Court's composition such as the
replacement of O'Connor with Alito are themselves traceable to shifts in
public opinion. A more conservative public elected and reelected George W.
Bush. A more liberally minded public elected Barack Obama, who ap-
pointed Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. But that extremely indirect
relationship does not resemble the constitutional conversation between the
public and the Court that Friedman envisions. Instead, it is the ordinary
process of appointment and confirmation contemplated by the Constitution.
The fact that the Justices achieve their positions through such a political
process, which requires the nominee to conform to certain accepted norms
of legal thinking in order to secure the support of the president and a major-
ity of the Senate, also means that the Court is surpassingly unlikely to be
composed of a majority of members who hold views that are significantly
outside the mainstream. That is all the more true given the modern tendency
to appoint Justices who have already served for many years as judges or
who otherwise have significant public profiles. Although, in an era of stealth
confirmations, nominees frequently will not have stated views on hot-button
questions such as abortion that could give rise to significant political fights,
they are at least well-known enough that there is little prospect they will
later support revolutionary theories that would take the Court outside the
mainstream of public opinion. To pick two stark but illustrative examples,
the president is very unlikely to pick a nominee who believes in a radically
narrower vision of presidential power, and the Senate will be hesitant to
confirm a nominee who believes in a dramatically constrained view of Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause, which could threaten the
legacy of both the New Deal and the civil rights revolution.
The lonely position of Justice Thomas is illustrative. Thomas was ap-
pointed at a very young age, when his jurisprudential views were
undeveloped or at least poorly known. He now regularly dissents, urging the
Court to overrule prior lines of settled precedent." But those dissents are
generally solo opinions, with no other member of the Court willing to chart
54. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun Free School
Zones Act for lack of findings), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating
federal statute providing remedy for sexual assaults), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
(sustaining application of federal drug laws to local marijuana production and consumption).
55. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); Maryland v.
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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such significant new directions in the law. Even when his other colleagues
agree with Justice Thomas that a prior case was wrongly decided, stare de-
cisis presents a significant constraint on its overruling. A Court that included
five members who are as willing as Justice Thomas to reconsider long-
established constitutional law on prominent questions could come into
direct conflict with public opinion, to which it might need to adapt, but that
does not resemble the Court we actually have.
C. The Court and Public Opinion
It should be no surprise that the Court's decisions do not track develop-
ments in public opinion. American law-including constitutional law-is
like an iceberg: most of it (including the most dangerous parts) lies below
the surface. As the above discussion of the October 2009 Term illustrates,
the public is completely unaware of the overwhelming majority of the
Supreme Court's constitutional law jurisprudence. Ordinary Americans keep
abreast of only a trivial proportion of the laws that Congress enacts, the ex-
ecutive orders that the president issues, and the regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate. The fact that a particular ruling is
issued by the Supreme Court and involves the Constitution does not make it
so different in kind that it uniquely generates significant public debate. After
all, only a small percentage of Americans can even name one of the
Justices.
To be sure, Supreme Court decisions do generate immediate commen-
tary in the blogosphere on sites like SCOTUSblog and longer-term
academic analysis in law journals like this one. But there is no reason to
believe that the opinions of those authors reflect broader public opinion in a
fashion that would give comfort to those concerned with the power of un-
elected judges. Nor is that sort of elite commentary likely to lead the Court
to change its course in any event.
To the extent the public is in fact paying attention to a particular consti-
tutional issue-or to the ideology of the Court more broadly-the Justices
employ several tools that minimize the prospect that public opinion will
coalesce against their decisions. Unlike the other branches of government,
the Supreme Court does not have a public relations operation that engages
in "spin." But we know from personal experience that most of the Justices
do have relationships with national reporters. The left and the right of the
Court also have committed constituencies that work hard to validate high-
profile ideological decisions with which they agree. Obviously, those deci-
sions are equally subject to attack from ideological opponents. But the result
is a he-said, she-said fight that is unlikely to drive around a public consensus
that could give the Court such significant concern that it would reverse
course.
56. E.g., Jimm Phillips, Elena Who? Only 19 Percent of Poll Respondents Can Name
SCOTUS Nominee, WASH. INDEP. (June 24, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.con/88198/elana-
who-only-19-percent-of-poll-respondents-can-name-scotus-nominee (citing Findlaw.com poll indi-
cating that only 35 percent of respondents could name even one of the current Justices).
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Equally important, the Court frequently shapes its decisions as taking in-
terim steps that tend not to generate significant controversy. For example,
rather than overruling Roe v. Wade, the Court continues to decide individual
cases that significantly narrow the abortion right; 7 rather than outlawing
affirmative action, the Court has made it significantly more difficult to sus-
tain;" rather than jettisoning Miranda altogether, 9 the Court has limited its
application, including in the three cases from the most recent term;" rather
than abandoning the exclusionary rule, the Court has adopted a cost-benefit
calculus that limits its application significantly;1 and rather than holding
unconstitutional section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court expressed sig-
nificant doubts about the statute's validity absent further revision by
Congress.62 Each of those lines of decisions represents an important devel-
opment in constitutional law but is sufficiently incremental that it tends not
to generate significant public controversy.
The Court can also quietly shape substantive outcomes by limiting ac-
cess to the courthouse in the first instance. The recent rulings in Ashcroft v.
Iqbalt and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly" may create significant obstacles
to filing complaints, particularly in civil rights matters alleging discrimina-
tion without direct proof of animus, but both involve pleading standards that
are not easily understood except by lawyers. The doctrines of standing and
ripeness also have the effect of substantially, but unobtrusively, restricting
litigation in hot-button areas that otherwise might draw public attention. For
example, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation significantly nar-
rowed the pool of potential plaintiffs who may challenge governmental
funding of religious organization by forbidding such suits when based on
"taxpayer standing." Another example is the Court's significant trend in the
direction of precluding preenforcement constitutional challenges to legisla-
tion-a common tool in civil rights litigation.6
But in the rare instances in which the Court's decisions directly conflict
with a broad swath of public opinion, the institution has sufficient built-up
capital that it emerges essentially unscathed and undaunted. Bush v. Gore is
an excellent example. The decision triggered a wave of popular and expert
57. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
58. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
59. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda).
60. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213; Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
61. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
62. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. I v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
63. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
64. 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
65. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
66. See L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Nat'1 En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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disapproval. But opinion polls in the wake of the ruling showed no material
diminution in the Court's standing.
The heightened standing of the modem Court in the public's eye is in
fact a significant factor for which The Will of the People fails to account in
extrapolating from historical examples. Friedman places significant weight
on the "switch in time that saved nine" (p. 225), in which the Court blinked
in its objection to New Deal legislation in order to stave off the prospect of
the court-packing plan (pp. 225-34). He also emphasizes the concerns over
the enforceability of the Court's desegregation jurisprudence in cases such
as Cooper v. Aaron (p. 248).' At those moments in American history, the
prospect that the Court would lose its independence or have its rulings
flouted represented substantial and realistic threats, and Friedman provides
substantial opinion to believe that the Court in those instances was particu-
larly attentive to the public's views.
Put simply, times have changed. There is no prospect in the current era
that the Court would suffer such significant blows. The very structure of the
Constitution provides the Justices tremendous independence from public
opinion by guaranteeing life tenure during good service. There has not been
a material movement to rein in the Court by changing its composition, or a
realistic threat to disobey its rulings, in many decades. Even relatively mea-
ger proposals to require the Court to televise its proceedings consistently fall
flat in the face of invocations of judicial independence.69 The Court's role in
American life is now entirely entrenched and broadly accepted.
Relatedly, only a handful of the constitutional questions that the current
Court decides are so foundationally contested as the power of Congress to
respond to the Great Depression and the Court's authority to enforce an end
to governmentally sanctioned racial discrimination. Even the criminal pro-
cedure revolution of the Warren and Burger Courts, which was the subject of
sustained efforts by both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan to drive public
opposition, now seems widely accepted.70 As discussed above, only core
cases related to gun rights, abortion, religion, race, and gay rights currently
strike anything approaching such a chord in the public's mind. Those make
up perhaps one case per term. And at least with respect to three of those is-
sues-firearms, abortion, and gay rights-the Court's rulings do not create
the kinds of insurmountable obstacles to assertions of rights that might gen-
67. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Rating of Supreme Court Improves as Partisans Switch Sides,
GALLUP (June 22, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/121196/rating-supreme-court-improves-
partisans-switch-sides.aspx (citing Gallup poll in June 2001 indicating that 62 percent of Americans
approved of job Court was doing).
68. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
69. See, e.g., Matt Sundquist, Cameras and the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 29,
2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/cameras-and-the-supreme-court/ (summarizing unsuc-
cessful proposals).
70. Rasmussen Reports, 33% Say Legal System Worries Too Much About Individual Rights,
June 4, 2010 ("[T]he vast majority of adults (87%) believe police officers when making an arrest
should be required to read people their Miranda rights, while only nine percent (9%) disagree.").
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erate significant public opposition, because advocates can and do seek alter-
native relief from legislatures and state courts.
Looking forward, there seem to be few questions that will correspond to
Friedman's model of a Court that responds to an evolved consensus in pub-
lic opinion. Three major constitutional fights are headed towards the
Supreme Court. Several states have challenged provisions of the sweeping
health care reform legislation of 2010; the most significant argument is that
Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to require the pur-
chase of health insurance." Those arguments seem tenuous in light of the
Court's decisions upholding the federal power to regulate medical mari-
juana72 and the power to detain sexually dangerous individuals.7 1 Similarly,
significant provisions of Arizona's immigration legislation seem preempted
under the Court's jurisprudence assigning principal responsibility for immi-
gration questions to the federal government.74 But although the issue has
generated enormous public attention, there is no prospect of the develop-
ment of a political consensus to which the Court could conform, thus
obviating concerns over the power of an unelected judiciary.
The one exception that may prove the rule that the Supreme Court's
constitutional law rulings correspond to the views of a majority of the ap-
pointees rather than to the views of the general public is gay marriage. Even
within the gay rights community, there has been significant controversy over
whether the Court is prepared to accept the claim that laws defining mar-
riage as exclusively the union of a man and a woman-with corresponding
rights and recognition limited to heterosexual couples-are unconstitu-
tional.7 ' That profound question may in fact be so significant that several of
the Justices-including Justice Kennedy-may give public opposition sig-
nificant weight. On the other hand, the Court's more liberal members and
Justice Kennedy may agree with the assertion that homosexuals have an
equivalent right to marry and may view the claim as on par with seminal
desegregation precedents, in which the Court led public opinion rather than
followed it (p. 242). But in whatever term that question reaches the Justices,
few if any of the other constitutional cases will be written in an effort to re-
flect in the first instance, or later be modified to correspond to, public
opinion.
71. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida ex rel.
McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
72. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
73. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
74. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010).
75. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes Down California's Proposition 8: Will The Ruling Ulti-
mately Advance Or Retard Civil Rights for LGBT Americans?, FINDLAW (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html ("[T]he Perry litigation poses serious risks for
LGBT activists and for progressive politicians more broadly. One such risk is that the case will




Professor Friedman has written a thorough, well-researched, and engag-
ing history of the development of the Supreme Court's public standing and
its constitutional law jurisprudence. But because his theory that the Court
adapts to developments in public opinion addresses, at most, only a tiny
proportion of the Court's modem constitutional rulings, The Will of the Peo-
ple does not articulate a persuasive response to critics who complain that the
J6Justices' decisions thwart democratic governance.
76. This Review has been limited to the question whether the Court's decisions do in fact
ultimately reflect popular will. There is a further question whether the theory of The Will of the
People, even if descriptively accurate, would persuasively respond to the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty. The Constitution did not adopt a system of referenda, and because Congress sometimes
mediates popular will, responding to public opinion is not the same as respecting democratic gov-
ernance. For the same reason, the act of bowing to negative public reaction to a particular
interpretation of the Constitution is not the same as respecting democratic institutions.
978 [Vol. 109:963
